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ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS: DOES
28 U.S.C. § 1109(b) CONFER
AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT
OF INTERVENTION?
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19781 provides
See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). Congress was granted the power to enact bankruptcy legislation through Article 1 of the
United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.4. This clause provides in pertinent part that: "The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." Id.
The Senate Report for the Bankruptcy Reform Act stated that the purpose of the Act
was "the modernization of the bankruptcy laws." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5788. The Senate Report further
noted that "[tihe substantive law of bankruptcy and the current bankruptcy system were
designed in 1898, and underwent the last significant overhaul in 1938." Id. "The Bankruptcy [Reform] Act of 1978 . . .made significant changes in both the substantive and
procedural law of bankruptcy." Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50, 53 (1982).
The 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act is divided into four titles. Pub. L. No. 95-598,. 92
Stat. 2549 (1978). Title I codifies and enacts substantive bankruptcy law as title 11 of the
United States Code. Id. Title II establishes a system of bankruptcy courts and their corresponding jurisdiction. Id. at 2657-73. See also T. CRANDALL., R. HAGEDORN & F. SMITH,
DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW MANUAL
11.01[3], at 11-5 (1985) (Act gave bankruptcy courts
"sweeping and pervasive jurisdiction over practically all bankruptcy matters"); B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL
6.01, at 6-2 (1986 & Supp. 1989) (Act
"made sweeping changes with respect to bankruptcy court jurisdiction and case administration by greatly expanding the role and powers of bankruptcy judges"). See generally Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Court Under the New Bankruptcy Law: Its Structure and Jurisdiction, 55
AM. BANKR. L.J. 63 (1981) (discussing bankruptcy courts established by 1978 Act and their
jurisdiction). Title III of the 1978 Act entitled "Amendments To Other Acts," contains
amended provisions of other miscellaneous acts, as well as various definitions. Pub. L. No.
95-598, 92 Stat. at 2673-82. Title IV sets forth provisions for a transition period for the
new Act, and repeals the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and its amendments. Id. at 2682-88. See
generally CRANDALL, HAGEDORN & SMITH, supra, 1 10.03, at 10-5 to 10-10 (discussion of
legislative history and organization of Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978); G. TREISTER, J.
TROST, L. FORMAN, K. KLEE & R. LEVIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 1-11 (1988)
(addressing events leading to enactment of 1978 Act); Klein, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, 53 Am.BANKR. L.J. 1 (1979) (analyzing major changes of Act).
The broad grant of judicial power given to bankruptcy judges under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 was subsequently found to be unconstitutional. See Northern Pipeline,
458 U.S. at 87. The Court in Northern Pipeline held that untenured federal judges could
not exercise the broad powers granted to them under the Act, since judicial power of Article III district courts had been impermissibly vested in non-Article III courts by the Act.
Id. at 86-87. The Court's decision applied prospectively and was stayed to allow Congress
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for the reorganization of an insolvent business.2 While the debtorin-possession' or the trustee4 continues to operate the business, a
to adopt new legislation without interfering with bankruptcy law administration. Id. at 88.
In 1984, Congress amended the 1978 Act. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). The 1984 Act gives original and exclusive jurisdiction of bankruptcy cases to federal district courts. See 28 U.S.C. §
1334 (1988) (corresponds to Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,
title I, § 101(a), 98 Stat. 333, 333). Under the 1984 Amendments, bankruptcy judges are
designated for each district. See 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1988) (corresponds to Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, title 1, § 104(a), 98 Stat. 333, 336). District courts are given jurisdiction to hear appeals from the decisions of bankruptcy judges.
See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988) (corresponds to Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, title 1, § 104(a), 98 Stat. 333, 341). See generally CRANDALL, HAGEDORN &
SMrrH, supra, 1 11.01[3], at 11-5 to 11-7 (discussing 1984 Amendments); WEINTRAUB &
RESNICK,

supra, I 6.04, at 6-12 to 6-15 (same).

Title 11 of the United States Code (Title I of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978)
divides substantive bankruptcy law into chapters which are known collectively as the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988). Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code deals
with the reorganization of insolvent businesses. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (1988). For a
general discussion of Chapter. 11, see King, Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM.
BANKR.

L.J. 107 (1979).

' See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (1988) (corresponds to Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2626-44 (1978)).
In 1938, Congress passed the Chandler Act which added Chapter X to the Bankruptcy

Act of 1898. 5 COLLIER

ON BANKRUPTCY

11100.01, at 1100-1 n.1 (15th ed. 1989) (citing

Act of June 22, 1938, L. 575, 52 Stat. 840). Chapter X was one of several chapters which
provided for the reorganization of an insolvent business. Id. The Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 condensed the various kinds of available reorganizations into one kind of bankruptcy action under Chapter 11. CRANDALL, HAGEDORN & SMITH, supra note 1, § 10.04[3],
at 10-15. The main purpose of Chapter 11 is to reorganize the debts of a business in order
to permit the continuation of business operations. See In re Russell, 60 Bankr. 42, 44
(Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1985). See also Blum, Treatment of Interest on Debtor Obligations in Reorganizations Under the Bankruptcy Code, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 430, 432 n.1 1 (1983) (purpose of
Chapter 11 reorganization is continued use of debtor's assets).
A business reorganization restructures a business' debts in order to maintain operations,
employ workers, pay creditors, and yield a return for its stockholders. H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 6179.
"The purpose of the reorganization . . . case is to formulate and have confirmed a plan of
reorganization . . . for the debtor. The [reorganization] plan determines how much creditors will be paid, and in what form ... whether the stockholders will continue to retain any
interest ... and in what form the business will continue .... " Id. at 6180.
A Chapter 11 reorganization is commenced by the filing of a petition. Berge v. Sweet (In
re Berge), 37 Bankr. 705, 706 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983). The reorganization may be voluntarily or involuntarily commenced. See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1988) (commencement of voluntary case); see, e.g., In re Chester, 61 Bankr. 261, 262 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1986) (voluntary bankruptcy petition filed by debtor). See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1988) (commencement of involuntary
case); see, e.g., In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 Bankr. 126, 131 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980)
(involuntary bankruptcy petition may be filed by petitioning creditor against debtor).
' See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (1988) (definition of debtor-in-possession). This section provides in pertinent part: " 'debtor in possession' means debtor except when a person that
has qualified under . . . this title . . . is serving as trustee in this case." Id.
After a Chapter 11 petition is filed, there is a presumption that the debtor will remain
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plan for reorganizing the business' debt is formulated.' Although
"in control and possession of the business." In re H & S Transp. Co., Inc., 55 Bankr. 786,
790 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982). Accord In re B & W Tractor Co., Inc., 38 Bankr. 613, 61415 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984) (debtor continues to operate business as debtor-in-possession
after filing of chapter 11 petition); In re Garland Corp., 6 Bankr. 456, 460 (Bankr. App.
Panel D. Mass. 1980) (debtor continues in control of business); Dardarian v. La Sherene,
Inc. (In re La Sherene, Inc.), 3 Bankr. 169, 174 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (same).
The debtor, who remains in control of the business, is a fiduciary who represents each
creditor of the bankrupt estate as well as the interests of the estate itself. In re Roblin
Indus., Inc., 52 Bankr. 241, 243 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985); First State Bank of Crossett,
Arkansas v. W.E. Tucker Oil Co., Inc. (In re W.E. Tucker Oil, Inc.), 42 Bankr. 897, 899
(Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1985). The debtor-in-possession has all the rights (except the right to
compensation), functions and duties (with limited exceptions) of a trustee in a Chapter 11
case. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1988) (listing rights, powers and duties of debtor-in-possession). See, e.g., Fanelli v. Hensley (In re Triangle Chems., Inc.), 697 F.2d 1280, 1283-84
(5th Cir. 1983.) (debtor-in-possession has power to employ legal counsel on behalf of estate
with court approval); Goodman v. National Labor Relations Bd. (In re Gloria Mfg. Corp.),
47 Bankr. 370, 373 (E.D. Va. 1984) (debtor-in-possession has authority to "incur obligations for materials, supplies, and services" necessary for carrying on business).
The debtor-in-possession may be removed from controlling the business and a trustee
appointed by the court upon a showing of cause or if such appointment is in the best interests of the creditors and of the bankrupt estate itself. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988) (listing
circumstances for trustee's appointment). See, e.g., In re Ford, 36 Bankr. 501, 504-05
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983) (need for trustee appointment where debtor-in-possession failed to
submit factual monthly financial reports and comingled estate assets with his own); In re
Main Line Motors, Inc., 9 Bankr. 782, 784-85 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (trustee appointment
necessary where president and sole shareholder of debtor corporation transferred corporate funds prior to filing of bankruptcy petition).
See In re Town Crier Bottling Co., 123 F. Supp. 588, 592 (E.D. Mo. 1953). "The trustee in bankruptcy is a statutory officer of the court." Id. The appointment of a trustee is
governed by 11 U.S.C. § 1104. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (1988). "[A] trustee is not appointed
in a chapter .11 reorganization case unless the court, after notice and a hearing, determines
that there is cause for such an appointment." WEINTRAUB & RESNICK, supra note 1, 1
6.08[3], at 6-40.
A trustee acts as chief executive officer in charge of the business' operation, investigator
of the debtor's actions, and formulator of the Chapter 11 plan. J. BEINSTOCK, BANKRUPrcY
REORGANIZATION 285 (1987). The trustee is obligated to act in the "best interest of general
creditors" in managing the debtor's estate and "in preserving estate assets." WEINTRAUB &
RESNICK, supra note 1, 116.08, at 6-34. To facilitate a trustee's work, he or she is given
broad powers. Id. For a general discussion of trustee's duties, see Hughes, "Wavering Between the Profit and the Loss": Operating a Business DuringReorganization Under Chapter 11 of
the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 45, 56-59 (1980).
6 See 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (1988) (setting forth requirements for contents of plan). A reorganization plan must designate classes of claims; identify unimpaired and impaired classes
of claims or interests; give the same treatment to a specific class for each claim or interest
unless there is an agreement otherwise. Id. Among other things, the plan must also provide
adequate means for the plan's implementation; comply with the the statutory requirements
regarding the issuance of non-voting equity securities; and comply with the interests of the
creditors, equity security holders, and public policy. Id.
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1121, a debtor may file a plan in a reorganization case "until
after 120 days after the date of the order for relief under [Chapter 11]." 11 U.S.C. §
1121(b) (1988). However, if a trustee in bankruptcy has been appointed or the debtor
missed the statutory deadline for filing or the debtor's plan was not accepted, any party in
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creditors are stayed6 from further pursuit of their claims, a creditors' committee is appointed7 to represent and protect the crediinterest may file a reorganization plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (1988).
For a discussion on who may file a reorganization plan, see In re Crescent Beach Inn,
Inc., 22 Bankr. 155, 160 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982). In Crescent Beach, the court held that allowing any party in interest to file a plan would best serve the interests of both the debtor
and the creditors. Id. See also In re K. C. Marsh Co., Inc., 12 Bankr. 401, 403 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1981). "The debtor requesting relief has a duty to formulate a reorganization plan."
Id. See generally WEINTRAUB & RESNICK, supra note 1, V 8.19, at 8-84 to 8-86 (discussion of
who may file plan).
* See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988) (dealing with automatic stay). See also Pizza of Hawaii,
Inc. v. Department of Taxation, State of Hawaii (In re Pizza of Hawaii, Inc.), 12 Bankr.
796, 798 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1981). "The automatic stay is one of the fundamental protections afforded a debtor by the Bankruptcy Code. It gives the debtor an opportunity to
attempt a repayment or reorganization plan." Id.; BIENSTOCK, supra note 4, at 97. "The
filing of a petition with the bankruptcy court instantaneously shields the debtor from creditors' predatory acts - as if by magic." Id. Filing a petition for bankruptcy automatically
invokes the automatic stay. Id. The automatic stay precludes dismemberment of the
debtor's business, which aids the business' continued operation. Id.; WEINTRAUB & RESNICK,
supra note 1, 1 1.09[1], at 1-31. The automatic stay relieves the debtor of the financial
burdens which led to bankruptcy, such that the business may continue to operate. Id. The
stay, however, does not affect the creditors' substantive rights. Id. "[The stay] merely stops
collection efforts pending a determination of the creditors' and debtor's rights by the bankruptcy court." Id.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (1988). The statute provides in pertinent part:
(a)(1) As soon as practicable after the order for relief under chapter 11 of this title,
the United States trustee shall appoint a committee of creditors holding unsecured
claims ....
(2) On request of a party in interest, the court may order the appointment of
additional committees of creditors ... if necessary to assure adequate representation
of creditors ....
(b)(1) A committee of creditors appointed under subsection (a) of this section shall
ordinarily consist of the persons, willing to serve, that hold the seven largest claims
against the debtor of the kinds represented on such committee, or of the members
of a committee organized by creditors before the commencement of the case under
this chapter, if such committee was fairly chosen and is representative of the different kinds of claims to be represented.
Id. "The court is obligated to appoint a committee of creditors holding unsecured claims
,as soon as practicable' after the order for reorganization relief under chapter 11." WEINTRAUB & REsNIc , supra note 1, $ 8.12[1], at 8-60. Neither notice nor hearing are required
when the court appoints a creditors' committee. Id. at 8-60 n.2. See also Note, Standards
and Sanctions for the Use of Cash Collateral Under the Bankruptcy Code, 63 TEX. L. REv. 341,
344 n.24 (1984) (§ 1102 provides for mandatory appointment of unsecured creditors' committees in Chapter 11 cases).
Bankruptcy Rule 1007(d) requires the debtor in a Chapter 11 case to file a list of the
twenty largest creditors. 11 U.S.C. BANKR. R. 1007(d) (1988). "This list facilitates the rapid
selection of the creditors' committee." WEINTRAUB & RESNICK, supra note 1, $ 8.12[1], at 860 n.2. See, e.g., In re Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson &
Casey, 85 Bankr. 13, 17 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (seven largest creditors traditionally serve
on committee); In re Shaffer-Gordon Assocs., Inc., 40 Bankr. 956, 957 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1984) (committee composed of holders of seven largest unsecured claims). See generally
DeNatale, The Creditors' Committee Under the Bankruptcy Code - A Primer, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J.
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tors' interest in the ongoing business.8
In order to preserve the bankrupt estate, the debtor-in-possession or the trustee may institute an adversary proceeding.' Often,
43, 45-51 (1981) (overview of appointment of unsecured creditors' committee).
In addition to the mandatorily created committee, the United States trustee or the court
upon request of a party in interest, may appoint additional creditors' committees. See, e.g.,
In re Texaco Inc., 79 Bankr. 560, 566 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (additional creditors' committee not necessary if adequately represented); In re McLean Indus., 70 Bankr. 852, 861
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (no "hard and fast rule" for appointment of additional creditors'
committees; determination should be on case-by-case basis in order to achieve adequate
representation of creditors); Shaffer-Gordon, 40 Bankr. at 959 (additional creditors' committee not appointed since existing creditors' committee adequately represented creditors).
B See In re AKF Foods, Inc., 36 Bankr. 288, 289 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984). "The function
of a creditors' committee is to act as a watchdog on behalf of the larger body of creditors
which it represents." Id.; In re Daig Corp., 17 Bankr. 41, 43 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981). The
creditors' committee not only negotiates with the debtor on behalf of the creditors but also
represents the varied interests of its members. Id. See also Sowerwine v. Air Canada (In re
REA Holding Corp.), 8 Bankr. 75, 81 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980). "Those who serve on a
creditors' committee owe a fiduciary duty to all creditors which they fulfill by advising
creditors of their rights and of the proper course of action in the bankruptcy proceeding."
Id. (citing Bohack Corp. v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 607 F.2d 258, 262 n.4 (2d Cir.
1979)).
The scope of a creditors' committee's authority is encompassed in Section 1103 of Title
1I of the United States Code. See I I U.S.C. § 1103 (1988). The statute states in pertinent
part:
(a) [W]ith the court's approval, such committee may select and authorize the employment by such committee of one or more attorneys, accountants, or other agents, to
represent or perform services for such committee.

(b)....
(c) A committee .. . may (1) consult with the trustee or debtor in possession concerning the administration
of the case;
(2) investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the
debtor, the operation of the debtor's business and the desirability of the continuance
of such business, and any other matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a
plan;
(3) participate in the formulation of a plan, advise those represented by such committee of such committee's determinations as to any plan formulated, and collect
and file with the court acceptances or rejections of a plan;
(4) request the appointment of a trustee or examiner ... ; and
(5) perform such other services as are in the interest of those represented.
Id. See generally WEINRAUB & RESNICK, supra note 1,
8.12[2], at 8-62 to 8-64 (general
discussion of functions and powers of committees); DeNatale, supra note 7, at 51-52 (examination of functions and duties of creditors' committees under Chapters 7 and 11).
' See 11 U.S.C. BANKR. R. 7001 (1988). The rule provides:
An adversary proceeding is governed by the rules of this Part VII. It is a proceeding
(1) to recover money or property, except a proceeding to compel the debtor to deliver property to the trustee, or a proceeding under § 554(b) or § 725 of the Code,
Rule 2017, or Rule 6002, (2) to determine the validity, priority, or extent of a lien
of other interest in property, other than a proceeding under Rule 4003(d), (3) to
obtain approval pursuant to § 363(h) for the sale of both the interest of the estate
and of a co-owner in property, (4) to object to or revoke a discharge, (5) to revoke
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a creditors' committee, which has a vested interest in the bankrupt estate, seeks to intervene in this proceeding."0 Bankruptcy
courts are divided as to whether a committee's right to intervene
in an adversary proceeding is absolute pursuant to Section 1109(b)
of Title 11 of the United States Code [hereinafter § 1109(b)].1
an order of confirmation of a chapter 11 or chapter 13 plan, (6) to determine the
dischargeability of a debt, (7) to obtain an injunction or other equitable relief, (8) to
subordinate any allowed claim or interest, except when subordination is provided in
a chapter 9, 11, or 13 plan, (9) to obtain a declaratory judgment relating to any of
the foregoing, or (10) to determine a claim or cause of action removed pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1452.
Id. See, e.g., Sandy Ridge Oil Co., Inc. v. Centerre Bank Nat'l Ass'n (In re Sandy Ridge Co.,
Inc.), 807 F.2d 1332, 1334 (7th Cir. 1986) (court allowed Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession
to bring action to avoid encumbrance in property); Harewood v. Sarah Allen Home for the
Aged, Inc. (In re Sarah Allen Home, Inc.), 4 Bankr. 724, 725 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980)
(through adversary proceedings, debtors sought to avoid liens on allegedly exempt property). See generally Trost, Trial Practice Under the New Bankruptcy Rules, 47 AM. BANKR. L.J.
111, 111-13 (1973) (discussing applicability and organization of adversary rules).
10 See, e.g., D'Lites of America, Inc. v. Sheley (In re D'Lites of America, Inc.), 100 Bankr.
612, 614 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) (committee allowed to intervene in proceeding against
insider defendants or defendants with close relationship to debtor where intervention
would not delay or prejudice parties and debtor had requested committee's participation);
Rollert Co., Inc. v. Charter Crude Oil Co. (In re Charter Co.), 50 Bankr. 57, 59-60 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1985) (committee sought intervention where debtor brought adversary proceeding to invalidate secured lien claimed valid by minority of committee membership);
Security Bank & Trust v. Cloud Nine, Ltd. (In re Cloud Nine, Ltd.), 3 Bankr. 199, 200
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1980) (commitee sought to intervene in proceeding against debtor-in-possession initiated by other creditors to lift automatic stay). Cf. Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors of Allegheny Int'l, Inc. v. Mellon Bank, N.A. (In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc.), 107
Bankr. 518, 520 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (equity committee sought to intervene in proceeding
commenced by creditors' committee claiming that creditors' committee's counsel had conflict of interest); United Capital Corp. v. Sapolin Paints, Inc. (In re Sapolin Paints, Inc.), 6
Bankr. 582, 583 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980) (creditor bank sought to intervene in proceeding
brought by others against debtor to void bank's lien).
"' See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1988). See infra note 26 and accompanying text (text of §
1109(b)).
Compare Allegheny, 107 Bankr. at 525 (equity committee has unqualified right to intervene in adversary proceeding); Longfellow Indus., Inc. v. Blumberg (In re Longfellow Indus., Inc.), 76 Bankr. 338, 341 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (Marin's interpretation of §
1109(b), advocating absolute right of intervention, is preferable approach); Hanover Indus.
Mach. Co. v. American Can Co. (In re Hanover Indus. Mach. Co.), 61 Bankr. 551, 554
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (absolute right of intervention); D.H. Sharrer & Son, Inc. v. Sharrer
Inv. Trust (In re D.H. Sharrer & Son, Inc.), 44 Bankr. 976, 978-79 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1984)
(absolute right of intervention) and In re Overmyer, 30 Bankr. 123, 125 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1983) (same) with CVC, Inc. v. Conway, Patton & Bouhall, HR1O Bank One, Akron, N.A.
(In re CVC, Inc.), 106 Bankr. 478, 479-80 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989) (creditors' committee
had no absolute statutory right to intervene in adversary proceeding because it did not
demonstrate that its interests were not adequately represented); First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank
of Milwaukee v. Terex Corp. (In re Terex Corp.), 53 Bankr. 616, 623 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1985) (creditors' committee had no absolute right to intervene in adversary proceeding);
Kenan v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re George Rodman, Inc.), 33 Bankr. 348, 350
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Two United States courts of appeals decisions illustrate this division. 2 In Official Unsecured Creditors' Committee v. Michaels (In re

Marin Motor Oil, Inc.),"5 the Third Circuit held that § 1109(b) gave
a creditors' committee an absolute right of intervention. 4 The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Fuel Oil Supply and
5 held that § 1109(b) granted
Terminaling v. Gulf Oil Corporation"
no such absolute statutory right."' Recently, in Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny International, Inc. v. Mellon Bank,
N.A. (In re Allegheny International, Inc.),'7 a district court in the
Third Circuit followed Marin but highlighted the split between
the Third and Fifth Circuits. 8
This Note will attempt to resolve the conflict between the circuits as to whether a creditors' committee has an absolute right to
intervene in an adversary proceeding. First, it will discuss the applicable statutes which provide for the right of intervention. Next,
it will address the decisions of the Courts of Appeals for the Third
and Fifth Circuits as well as the decision in Allegheny. In light of
this discussion and several policy considerations, this Note will
then assert that there is no absolute right of intervention.
I.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR THE RIGHT OF INTERVENTION

In a civil action, the result of the litigation often affects nonparties to the suit.1 9 Through the procedure of intervention, 0
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983) (no statute granting unconditional right to intervene) and
Segarra v. Banco Central y Economias (In re Segarra), 14 Bankr. 870, 878 (Bankr. D.P.R.
1981) (§ 1109(b) does not permit creditors to intervene in proceedings).
"i See infra notes 13-16 and accompanying text (holdings of Marin and Fuel Oil).
" 689 F.2d 445 (3rd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
1" Id. at 446. See infra notes 45-64 and accompanying text (discussion of Marin opinion).
10 762 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1985).
14 Id. at 1284, 1287-88. See infra notes 65-75 and accompanying text (discussion of Fuel
Oil opinion).
"7 107 Bankr. 518 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
1" Id. at 523-25. See infra notes 76-89 and accompanying text (discussion of Allegheny
opinion).
11 7C C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2d 228
(1986). See Kennedy, Let's All Join In: Intervention Under Federal Rule 24, 57 Ky. L.J. 329,
329-30 (1969) (questions "status of a non-party who feels that the outcome of the litigation
will affect his interests"); Moore & Levi, Federal Intervention - L The Right To Intervene and
Reorganization, 45 YALE L.J. 565, 565-67 (1936) (queries non-party's protection); Note, The
Litigant and the Absentee in Federal Multiparty Practice, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 531, 531 (1968)
(procedural devices must protect all those concerned with dispute, including absentees).
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these non-parties are able to protect their interests by participating in the lawsuit. 21 Intervention also contributes to the efficiency
of the dispute's resolution.2 2 Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides for intervention as a matter of right. 23 Intervention as of right can be triggered when a United States statute
grants an unconditional right of intervention.24
,o See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 548-49 (3d ed. 1985). "Intervention
means . . . a procedure by which one who was not originally a party to an action can
interject himself into litigation commenced between others. By doing so, intervenors can
protect their interests against possible adverse effects of a judgment .... " Id. at 548-49;
WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 19, at 228. "Intervention [is] a procedure by which an
outsider with an interest in a lawsuit may come in as a party though he has not been named
as a party by the existing litigants .... " Id.
21 See Moore & Levi, supra note 19, at 565 (intervention useful in protecting
non-parties); Shreve, Questioning Intervention of Right - Toward a New Methodology of Decision Making,
74 Nw. U.L. REV. 894, 895 (1980) ("need to intervene is traditionally measured by the
possible adverse consequences of the adjudication upon [absentee's] interests"). See also
Note, supra note 19, at 541 ("to deny intervention is tantamount to denying [an interested
non-party] a day in court").
In granting intervention, competing interests need to be considered. Kennedy, supra
note 19, at 334. "In the usual intervention question, there are three interests to be considered - the protection of the nonparties, trial convenience, and the protection of the original parties." Cohn, The New FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEo. L.J. 1204, 1232 (1966).
2 See Brunet, A Study in the Allocation of Scarce Judicial Resources: The Efficiency
of Federal
Intervention Criteria, 12 GA. L. REV. 701, 719-20 (1978). Through intervention, the main
case and corollary issues are consolidated into one action thereby avoiding duplicative litigation. Id. at 719. As a result, the time and costs of litigation are reduced, inconsistent
"fact finding or law determination" is prevented, and the complications of collateral estoppel are avoided. Id. at 719-20. See also Note, supra note 19, at 531 ("Procedural devices
permitting multiparty litigation are designed to achieve the prompt adjudication of an entire dispute and to eliminate unnecessary and repetitive litigation."). But see Stadin v.
Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 912 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 915 (1962). The court
noted that intervention brings "added complexity; the inevitable problems attendant upon
additional witnesses, interrogatories and depositions; expanded pretrial activity; greater
length of trial; and elements of confusion." Id. at 920. The court then noted "[t]hese
problems in themselves suggest delay and the clouding of the issues involved in the original
causes of action." Id.
"OSee FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a). The statute reads in pertinent part:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede
the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
Id. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b) (provides for permissive intervention). See generally Kennedy, supra note 19, at 331-38 (discussion of Federal Rule 24).
" See supra note 23 (text of Federal Rule 24(a)(1)). For examples of statutes which grant
an unconditional statutory right of intervention, see Carter v. School Bd. of W. Feliciana
Parish, 569 F. Supp. 568, 570-71 (M.D. La. 1983) (construed 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2 as giv-
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Some bankruptcy courts interpret § 1109(b) as a statute providing for an unconditional right of intervention in adversary proceedings."' Section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that:
"[a] party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security holders' committee, a creditor,
an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee, may raise and
ing U.S. Attorney General absolute right to intervene in equal protection cases); O'Keefe
v. New York City Bd. of Elections, 246 F. Supp. 978, 980 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (construed
28 U.S.C. § 2403 as giving U.S. absolute right to intervene when constitutionality of congressional act affecting public interest in question). But see Wilson v. Wilson, 475 So. 2d
194, 196 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985) (construed § 38-10-7 of Alabama Child Support Act as not
granting Department of Pensions & Security absolute right to intervene under Alabama's
Rule 24(a)(1) in child support proceeding). See generally Brunet, supra note 22, at 727-28
(discussing unconditional intervention).
Intervention as a matter of right is also granted when the intervenor has a related interest in the litigation which is not being protected by the existing parties. See FED. R. Civ. P.
24(a)(2); see supra note 23 (text of Federal Rule 24(a)(2)). See also Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Dingwell, 884 F.2d 629, 637 (1st Cir. 1989) (one requirement for intervention is that applicant must be so situated that disposition of action may as practical matter impair or impede
applicant's ability to protect that interest); Moosehead Sanitary Dist. v. Phillips Corp., 610
F.2d 49, 52 (1st Cir. 1979) (same); Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 501 So. 2d 377, 381
(Miss. 1987) (same). See generally Kennedy, supra note 19, at 340-54 (discussing Federal
Rule 24(a)(2)); Note, Intervention of Right in Class Actions: The Dilemma of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(aX2), 50 CALIF. L. REV. 89 (1962) (same).
Applications for intervention must be made in a timely manner. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a),
(b). "Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action ...." Id.;
see supra note 23 (text of Federal Rule 24(a)). "The timeliness requirement was not
designed to penalize prospective intervenors for failing to act promptly; rather, it insures
that existing parties to the litigation are not prejudiced by the failure of would-be intervenors to act in a timely fashion." Garrity v. Gallen, 697 F.2d 452, 455 (1st Cir. 1983). "Timeliness is a function of the relative prejudice to the existing parties and the would-be intervenor." United States v. Marion County School Dist., 590 F.2d 146, 148 (5th Cir. 1979).
Timeliness of the motion for intervention is a matter within the sound discretion of the
court and is determined from all the relevant circumstances. Jones v. Caddo Parish School
Bd., 704 F.2d 206, 218 (5th Cir. 1983); Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 579, 582
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982). See generally Note, The Requirement of Timeliness
Under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 37 VA. L. REV. 863 (1951) (review of
cases on timeliness).
" See, e.g., Allegheny, 107 Bankr. at 523 (§ 1109(b) interpreted as granting absolute statutory right of intervention to committee under Federal Rule 24(a)(1)); Longfellow Indus.,
Inc. v. Blumberg (In re Longfellow Indus., Inc.), 76 Bankr. 338, 341 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1987) (same); Hanover Indus. Mach. Co. v. American Can Co. (In re Hanover Indus. Mach.
Co.), 61 Bankr. 551, 554"(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (same). But see Fuel Oil, 762 F.2d at 1286
(§ 1109(b) interpreted as not granting absolute statutory right of intervention in adversary
proceedings to creditors' committee under Federal Rule 24(a)(1)); CVC, Inc. v. Conway,
Patton & Bouhall, HR1O Bank One, Akron, N.A., (In re CVC, Inc.), 106 Bankr. 478, 480
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989) (same); First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank of Milwaukee v. Terex Corp.
(In re Terex Corp.), 53 Bankr. 616, 623 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (same); Kenan v. Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re George Rodman, Inc.), 33 Bankr. 348, 350 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1983) (same).
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may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this
26
chapter."
The language of § 1109(b) is derived from Chapter X Section
206 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1938,2' and correspondingly from
Chapter X Bankruptcy Rule 10-210(a)(1), itself originating from
Section 206.28 Chapter X Section 206, in turn, was based upon
Section 77B, which Congress found too restrictive 29 because the
section provided creditors and stockholders with an absolute right
to be heard in only two circumstances.3 0 Congress enacted Section
206 to expand participation rights in corporate reorganization
proceedings in order to contribute to the case's
' 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1988).
'7 See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 116, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &

NEws 5787, 5902. "Subsection (a) ... is derived from . . .Chapter X (11 U.S.C.
606)." Id. "The Senate Report actually referred to this section [§ 1109(b)] as 1109(a), since
prior to final amendments 1109(a) and 1109(b) were the reverse of their final version."
Marin, 689 F.2d at 451 n.5.
Section 206 of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act of 1938 read in relevant part: "The
debtor, the indenture trustees, and any creditor or stockholder of the debtor shall have the
right to be heard on all matters arising in a proceeding under this chapter." Bankruptcy
Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-575, § 206, 52 Stat. 840, 894 (1938).
" See 5 COLLIER, supra note 2, 1 1109.02[2], at 1109-17. Chapter X Bankruptcy Rule 10210(a)(1) read as follows: "(a) Standing to Be Heard. (1) The debtor, the indenture trustees,
and any creditor or stockholder of the debtor shall have the right to be heard on all matters arising in a Chapter X case." Chapter X Bankruptcy Rule 10-210(a)(1), reprinted in
13A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 10-210-1 (14th ed. 1977).
" See S.REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 33 (1938) (noted in In re Keystone Realty
Holding Co., 117 F.2d 1003, 1005 (3d Cir. 1941)). "Former restrictions on such right to
be heard are eliminated as being undesirable." Keystone, 117 F.2d at 1005. See also
Horowitz v. Kaplan (In re Waltham Watch Co.), 193 F.2d 64, 66 (1st Cir. 1951) (§ 206 was
"intended by Congress to eliminate procedural barriers to full participation in the reorganization proceedings by interested persons"), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 946 (1952); Chemical
Bank v. Slaner (In re Duplan Corp.), 450 F. Supp. 790, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (§ 206 "eliminate[d] the previously restricted rights of interested parties" under 77B). See generally 6
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, Part 2
9.23[1], at 1689-1700 (14th ed. 1978) (discussing purpose, scope, and effect of § 206).
80 See Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911, 917 (1934) (creditors and stockholders only had absolute right to be heard on permanent appointment of trustee and on
approval of any reorganization plan). See also Dana v. SEC, 125 F.2d 542, 543 (2d Cir.
1942) (creditors and stockholders may be heard; court noted deliberate change in rule);
Rogers v. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co., 114 F.2d 108, 110 (9th Cir. 1940) (leave to intervene not necessary for stockholder to propose changes to reorganization plan); Tetzke v.
Trust No. 2988 of Foreman Trust & Say. Bank (In re Trust No. 2988 of Foreman Trust &
Say. Bank), 85 F.2d 942, 943 (7th Cir.) (recognized creditors' right to be heard on appointment of trustee and confirmation of reorganization plan, even without permission to intervene), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 609 (1936); 6 COLLIER, Part 2, supra note 29,
9.23[1], at
1690-91 (discussion of two instances in which creditors and stockholders could be heard
under § 77B).
ADMIN.
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"democratization.""
The current version of § 1109(b) was also derived in part from
Chapter X Bankruptcy Rule 10-210(a)(1). 8' Pursuant to Chapter
X Section 206 and Chapter X Bankruptcy Rule 10-210(a)(1), the
debtor, the indenture trustees, and any creditor or stockholder of
the debtor had an absolute right to be heard in a bankruptcy
case. 33 In contrast, Chapter X Section 207 of the 1938 Bankruptcy Act3 4 and Bankruptcy Rule 10-210(b), its corresponding
rule, provided for permissible intervention for cause.3 1 When
Congress derived the language of § 1109(b) from a mandatory
statute rather than from a permissive one, it revealed a congressional intent to carry over an unconditional right of the creditors'
committee to be heard in a case under § 1109(b). 6 Whether this
1 6 COLLIER, Part 2, supra note 29,
9.23[l], at 1692 (footnote omitted). See SEC v.
American Trailer Rentals, 379 U.S. 594, 604 (1965) (aims of revised Chapter X includes
providing more protection to creditors and stockholders than previously provided by §
77B); Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633, 640 (1963) (Chapter X sought to broaden participation of interested groups). Cf. Continental Mortgage Investors v. SEC, 578 F.2d 872, 873
n.2 (1st Cir. 1978) (Chapter X intended to protect public investors better and to allow for
more extrinsic corporate reorganizations).
" See In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1042 (3d Cir. 1985) (Rule 10-210(a) is a predecessor of § 1109(b)); Matin, 689 F.2d at 451 (noted Congress' use of language from Rule
10-210(a) in § 1109(b)); D. H. Sharrer & Son, Inc. v. Sharrer Investment Trust (In re D. H.
Sharrer & Son, Inc.), 44 Bankr. 976, 979 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1984) (same). See also supra note
28 (text of Chapter X Rule 10-210(a)(1)).
Chapter X Bankruptcy Rule 10-210(a)(1), in turn, was based upon Section 206 of the
1938 Bankruptcy Act. See Chapter X Bankruptcy Rule 10-210 advisory committee's note,
reprinted in 13A COLLIER, supra note 28, 10-210.01, at 10-210-2. See also supra note 27
(text of Chapter X Section 206).
8 See supra notes 27-28 (text of Chapter X § 206 and Rule 10-210(a)(1), respectively).
Section 206 provided for a right to be heard "on all matters arising in a proceeding under
this chapter." Bankruptcy Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-575, § 206, 52 Stat. 840, 894
(1938). Furthermore, Chapter X Rule 10-210 provided for a "right to be heard on all
matters arising in a Chapter X case." Chapter X Bankruptcy Rule 10-21 0(a)(1), reprinted in
13A COLLIER, supra note 28, at 10-210-1. See Marin, 689 F.2d at 451 ("the slightly altered
language does not affect [sic] any change in the statute." (quoting 13A COLLIaRt, supra note
28, 1 10-210.02, at 10-210-3)); Sharrer, 44 Bankr. at 979 (same).
See Bankruptcy Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-575, § 207, 52 Stat. 840, 894 (1938).
Section 207 provided in pertinent part that "[tihe judge may for cause shown permit a
party in interest to intervene generally or with respect to any specified matter." Id.
" See 13A COLLIE.R, supra note 28, at 10-210-1. The text of Chapter X Rule 10-210(b)
provided: "(b) Intervention. The court may for cause shown permit any interested person to
intervene generally or with respect to any specified matter in the Chapter X case." Id. See
Chapter X Bankruptcy Rule 10-210 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 13A COLLIER,
supra note 28,
10-210.01, at 10-210-2. See generally 6 COLLIER, Part 2, supra note 29, 1
9.25, at 1708-1715 (discussion of Chapter X § 207 and Chapter X Rule 10-210(b)).
" See In re Penn-Dixie Indus., Inc., 9 Bankr. 936, 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("Chapter X is
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"right to be heard" in a case translates to a "right to intervene"
in an adversary proceeding is a matter on which the Third Circuit
in Marin and the Fifth Circuit in Fuel Oil have reached conflicting
7
results.3
In addition to Federal Rule 24 and § 1109(b), intervention is
also addressed in Bankruptcy Rules 201838 and 7024.19 Bankruptcy Rule 2018 provides for permissive intervention in a case by
any interested entity upon a showing of cause.4 0 The advisory
committee note to Rule 2018 states that the rule implements §
1109(b) of the Code4 1 and refers to Rule 7024 for intervention in
adversary proceedings. 2 The advisory committee note to Rule
7024 provides that Rule 2018 governs intervention in a case,
while Rule 7024 governs intervention in an adversary proceeding." Bankruptcy Rule 7024 makes Rule 24 of the Federal Rules
the predecessor to Chapter 11, and it is clear that Congress intended section I109(b) to
carry forward an absolute right to be heard on any issue arising in a chapter 11 reorganization." (citations omitted)). See also Marin, 689 F.2d at 452 ("[Clongress ...understood that
it was adopting the mandatory and not the permissive provision."); In re Ionosphere Clubs,
Inc., 101 Bankr. 844, 849 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("The legislative history indicates that
Congress sought to encourage and promote greater participation in reorganization cases..
..As a result, § 1109(b) ought to be construed broadly; an individual has the absolute right
to be heard and this ensures fair representation of all claimants." (citations omitted)).
"' Compare Marin, 689 F.2d at 446 (creditors' committee has absolute right to intervene
under § 1109(b)) with Fuel Oil, 762 F.2d at 1287 (creditors' committee has no absolute
statutory right to intervene under § 1109(b)). See generally notes 45-75 and accompanying
text (discussion of Marin, notes 45-64, and Fuel Oil, notes 65-75).
" 11 U.S.C. BANKR. R. 2018 (1988). Rule 2018 provides in pertinent part: "(a) Permissive Intervention. In a case under the Code, after hearing on such notice as the court
directs and for cause shown, the court may permit any interested entity to intervene generally or with respect to any specified matter." Id.
3' 11 U.S.C. BANKR. R. 7024 (1988). The Rule provides: "Rule 24 F.R.Civ.P. applies in
adversary proceedings." Id.
40 See 11 U.S.C. BANKR. R. 2018 (1988). See, e.g., In re Public Serv. Co. of N.H., 88
Bankr. 546, 551 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988) (providing case law gloss on Rule 2018).
41 See 11 U.S.C. BANKR. R. 2018 advisory committee's note (1988). "This rule ... implements § 1109 . . . of the Code." Id. "Pursuant to § 1109 of the Code, parties in interest
have a right to be heard .
I..."
Id. But see, e.g., Allegheny, 107 Bankr. at 524. ("[T]he
language in the Advisory Committee note stating that Rule 2018 implements § 1109 is at
best ambiguous, and does not seem sufficient basis for determining that § 1109 is exclusively limited to proceedings for which Rule 2018 is applicable.").
" See 11 U.S.C. BANKR. R. 2018 advisory committee's note (1988). "This [bankruptcy]
rule does not apply in adversary proceedings. For intervention in adversary proceedings,
see Rule 7024." Id.
"s See 11 U.S.C. BANKR. R. 7024 advisory committee's note (1988). The advisory committee's note provides:
A person may seek to intervene in the case under the Code or in an adversary proceeding relating to the case under the Code. Intervention in a case under the Code
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of Civil Procedure applicable in adversary proceedings."'
II.

CASE LAW INTERPRETING THE RIGHT OF INTERVENTION

A. Official Unsecured Creditors' Committee v. Michaels (In re Marin
Motor Oil, Inc.) - An Absolute Right to Intervene in Adversary
Proceedings
In Marin, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that
a creditors' committee in a Chapter 11 reorganization had an absolute right to intervene in adversary proceedings pursuant to §
109(b)."
Marin Motor Oil, Inc., filed a voluntary petition for reorganization under Chapter 1." Shortly thereafter, a creditors' committee was appointed to protect the interests of the company's creditors. 47 The committee filed a complaint seeking to include the
assets of various related companies in the bankrupt estate. 48 A
trustee was subsequently appointed at the committee's request and
a stipulation was entered into wherein the assets of Marin and the
related Marin companies would be frozen for 45 days. 49 The trustee then commenced two adversary proceedings in order to include the other Marin companies in the bankrupt estate and
thereby increase the assets available to the creditors. 50 The crediis governed by Rule 2018 and intervention in an adversary proceedings is governed
by this rule. Intervention in a case and intervention in an adversary proceeding must
be sought separately.
Id. See also Fuel Oil, 762 F.2d at 1287 ("The last sentence ... [of Bankruptcy Rule 7024
advisory committee's note] makes no sense if intervention in the 'case' provided entrance
to the adversary proceeding as well.").
" See 11 U.S.C. Bankr. R. 7024 (1988). See also CVC v. Conway, Patton & Bouhall,
HRIO Bank One, Akron, N.A., 106 Bankr. 478, 479 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989) (Rule 24 of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs in adversary proceedings through Bankruptcy
Rule 7024); Lussier v. Barrup (In re Barrup), 51 Bankr. 321, 322 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985)
(same); First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank of Milwaukee v. Terex Corp. (In re Terex Corp.), 53
Bankr. 616, 619 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (same); Kenan v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. (In
re George Rodman, Inc.), 33 Bankr. 348, 348 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983).
"Matin, 689 F.2d at 450-57.
Id. at 446.
47

Id.

48 Id. The related companies were owned and controlled by the sole shareholder of Ma-

rin Motor Oil and his wife. Id.
" Id. The committee in Matin voluntarily withdrew its complaint on the agreement that
the trustee file and "vigorously pursue" his own complaint. Id.
Matin, 689 F.2d at 446-47.
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tors' committee ultimately sought to intervene in these proceedings,51 claiming primarily that § 1109(b) granted them an absolute
5
right to do So. 1
The bankruptcy court denied the committee's motion to intervene but granted the committee amicus curiae status. 3 The committee appealed to the district court which reversed, holding that
the creditors' committee had an absolute right to intervene under
§ 1109(b). 5 ' The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision.55
After initially determining that it had jurisdiction to hear the
dispute,56 the court proceeded to discuss the merits of the controversy involving § 1109(b).57 It scrutinized the language of §
1109(b) and noted that the provision applied specifically to Chapter 11 reorganizations under which creditors' committees had extensive rights.58 The court asserted that the express language used
in the statute, "on any issue in a case," included adversary proceedings. 9 After analyzing the legislative history of § 1109(b), the
"' Id. The committee was concerned that the trustee had allowed the stipulation freezing
the assets of the Marins and the Marin companies to lapse, and was dissatisfied with the
trustee's performance overall. Id. at 447.
'
Id. The committee claimed that § 1109(b) conferred an absolute right of intervention
irrespective of the trustee's performance. Id.
" Id. The bankruptcy court interpreted the right to intervene under § 1109(b) as permissive not mandatory. Id. In granting the committee amicus curiae status, the bankruptcy
court allowed the committee to submit briefs on issues already raised. Id.
51 Id. The district court considered § 1 109(b) to be mandatory and as such the committee's participation as amicus curiae was insufficient to satisfy the statute. Id.
" Marin, 689 F.2d at 446.
" Id. at 447-49. Addressing the issue of jurisdiction, the court noted that while the
bankruptcy court order denying intervention was final and therefore appealable, there was
some question as to whether the district court order granting intervention was interlocutory or final in nature. Id. at 447-49. The court concluded that the district court order was
indeed final and therefore the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear the dispute. Id. at 449.
67 Id.
Id. at 449-50. The court noted that "failure to recognize that Congress intended a
creditors' committee to have more extensive rights in a reorganization than in a liquidation" had caused much confusion. Id. at 450.
' Id. at 451. The court stated that it was "unlikely that Congress would have used such
sweeping language if it had not meant 'case' to be a broadly inclusive term." Id. But see Fuel
Oil, 762 F.2d at 1286-87 (examining Congressional distinctions made between "case" and
"proceedings"); Kenan v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re George Rodman, Inc.), 33
Bankr. 348, 350 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983) ("when Congress speaks of a 'case' it does not
include an adversary proceeding .... ").
The Matin court noted that while neither "case" nor "adversary proceeding" was defined in the Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Rule 701 (then in effect) classified several pro-
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court concluded that the broad rights granted under Section 206
of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act of 1938 and Chapter X
Bankruptcy Rule 10-210(a) were carried over to § 1109(b). 60 The
court emphasized that § 1109(b) was derived from a mandatory
provision (Chapter X Section 206) rather than a permissive provision (Chapter X Section 207).61

The court addressed, but did not analyze whether Rule 24 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was applicable to adversary
proceedings.6" Finally, the court stated that a broad interpretation
of § 1109(b) advanced the principles of fairness.6" The court rejected the appellant's policy argument that an increase or delay in
litigation would result from giving interested parties an absolute
ceedings as adversary proceedings. Marin, 689 F.2d at 450. Today, adversary proceedings
are classified in Bankruptcy Rule 7001. See supra note 9 (text of Bankruptcy Rule 7001).
Additionally, the Matin court summarily dismissed the argument as to the difference between the commencement of an adversary proceeding (by the filing of a complaint under
the then existing Bankruptcy Rule 703) and the commencement of a case (by the filing of a
petition under 11 U.S.C. § 301). Matin, 689 F.2d at 450-51. See generally infra notes 92-101
and accompanying text (discussing distinctions between "case" and "proceedings").
$0Matin, 689 F.2d at 451-52. The court noted that Chapter X Section 206 broadened
the rights of creditors to participate in reorganization proceedings thereby eliminating the
restrictions that had been placed on creditors by Section 206's predecessor statute, Section
77B. Id. (citing In re Keystone Realty Holding Co., 117 F.2d 1003, 1005 (3d Cir. 1941)).
See also supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text (tracing legislative history of § 1109(b)).
61 Matin, 689 F.2d at 452. The court stated that the "lack of a counterpart to Section
207 in the current [Bankruptcy] Code leads to an anomaly in the appellants' position" since
the appellants, in stating that § 1109(b) applied to only cases, did not point out any statute
which allowed intervention in adversary proceedings. Id. Thus, the court suggested that
following this line of reasoning, the bankruptcy court could not have allowed intervention
in adversary proceedings even if it desired to do so. Id. But see Fuel Oil, 762 F.2d at 1287
(intervention in adversary proceeding permissive under Federal Rule 24(a)(2)); Rodman, 33
Bankr. at 350 (committee could intervene under Federal Rule 24(b)(2)); In re Citizens Loan
& Thrift Co., 7 Bankr. 88, 90 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1980) (Chapter X Bankruptcy Rule 10210(b), allowing for permissive intervention, applicable to proceedings under Chapter 11).
See also supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text (discussing Chapter X Section 206); supra
notes 34-35 and accompanying text (discussing intervention for cause under Chapter X
Section 207).
" Marin, 689 F.2d at 454. The court stated that Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure was applicable to adversary proceedings under Bankruptcy Rule 724. Id. Substituting Section 206 with § 1109(b) in its analysis, the court determined that Federal Rule 24
was rendered inapplicable to a § 1109(b) situation since Section 206 "(and presumably section 1109(b))" automatically provided for intervenor status. Id. However, the court stated
that it was not necessary to decide whether the creditors' committee must formally request
intervention pursuant to Federal Rule 24. Id.
63 Id. at 457. "[T]he broad and absolute construction of § 1109(b) comports with the
usual expectation of parties in interest that they will have a right to be heard, as parties in
interest, by the tribunal adjudicating their interests." Id. The court further noted that
"[t]his expectation has its roots in notions of due process and fair play .... " Id.
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right of intervention under § 1109(b).6 4
B. Fuel Oil Supply and Terminalingv. Gulf Oil Corporation - No Absolute Right to Intervene in Adversary Proceedings
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Fuel Oil held that
a creditors' committee did not have an absolute statutory right to
intervene under § 1109(b) in an adversary proceeding.6" In Fuel
Oil, the creditors' committee filed a motion under Rule 24(a)(1) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to intervene as of right in an
adversary proceeding." The district court denied the motion."'
Subsequently, the committee appealed to the Fifth Circuit."
The court of appeals noted that the issue of whether § 1109(b)
provided an absolute right to intervene in an adversary proceeding was one of first impression in the Fifth Circuit. 6 The court
first examined Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(1) and stated
that, as a general rule, courts were reluctant to find unconditional
statutory rights of intervention.7 0 Based on various distinctions
I/d. at 453. The court noted that an unqualified right of intervention had existed for
nearly four decades without a flood of proceedings. Id. "[W]here intervention is sought by
an official creditors' committee that hopes to speed up the proceedings and prevent dissipation of the estate, there is little danger that intervention will unnecessarily deplete the
estate, delay the conclusion of the case, or prejudice any party." Id. But see infra note 122
and accompanying text (discussing policy reasons for not allowing absolute right of intervention under § 1109(b)).
" Fuel Oil, 762 F.2d at 1287. See generally Graves, Intervention in Bankruptcy Adversary
Proceedings:No Longer an Absolute Statutory Right, 74 ILL. B.J. 280 (Feb. 1986) (agreeing with
Fuel Oil's holding).
Fuel Oil, 762 F.2d at 1284. Before the creditors' committee filed the motion to intervene however, it brought a suit to initiate an adversary proceeding which the court dismissed the suit for lack of standing. Id.
67 Id.
Id. On appeal, the creditors' committee argued that § 1109(b) was a " 'statute confer[ring] an unconditional right to intervene' within the meaning of rule 24(a)(1),
Fed.R.Civ.P." Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)). See supra note 23 (statutory language of
Federal Rule 24(a)); supra note 24 (examples of statutes granting absolute right of
intervention).
", Fuel Oil, 762 F.2d at 1285. The court noted that only a few other courts had addressed the issue of whether a creditors' committee had an absolute right of intervention in
an adversary proceeding pursuant to § 1109(b). Id. (citations omitted).
70 Id. at 1286 (citations omitted). The court reasoned that "[t]he statutes that do confer
an absolute right to intervene generally confer that right upon the United States or a federal regulatory commission; private parties are rarely given an unconditional statutory
right to intervene." Id. (citation omitted). See also supra note 24 (situations where courts
have granted absolute right to intervene to United States).
Based on the foregoing, the Fuel Oil court asserted that § 1109(b) was not the kind of
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made between "case" and "adversary proceedings" in Title 28 of
the United States Code and the Bankruptcy Rules, the court then
asserted that the term "case" in § 1109(b) did not include "adversary proceeding. ' 71 Since the court found § 1109(b) inapplicable
to adversary proceedings, the statute did not qualify as a statute
72
conferring an absolute, unconditional right of intervention.
Next, the court compared the committee's right of intervention
in adversary proceedings with the right to initiate such actions.7 3
The court reasoned that the right of initiation was not absolute
and therefore there was no absolute right of intervention in adversary proceedings .7 Finally, the court noted that the absence of
an absolute right to intervene in an adversary proceeding did not
infringe upon the statute's broad and important right to appear
and be heard since intervention as of right could still be sought
under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.7,
C. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny International, Inc. v. Mellon Bank, N.A. (In re Allegheny International, Inc.)
In Allegheny, the bankrupt company and its subsidiaries filed for
reorganization under Chapter 11.76 Prior to filing, the company
had engaged in some allegedly preferential transfers to a group of
statute which normally granted an absolute right of intervention. Fuel Oil, 762 F.2d at
1286.
71 Id. at 1286-87.
[A]n examination of the Code of Judiciary and Judicial Procedure (Title 28, United
States Code) and of the Bankruptcy Rules reveals that Congress in many instances
has drawn distinctions between bankruptcy "cases" and the proceedings related to
them. Examples of the distinctions drawn under Title 28 include separate provisions
dealing with jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1471(a) and (b); abstention, 28 U.S.C. §
1471(d) and 11 U.S.C. § 305 ....
Id. at 1286. See infra notes 92-101 and accompanying text (discussion of distinctions between "case" and "proceedings").
"' Fuel Oil, 762 F.2d at 1287. "We are convinced that Congress must have intended
courts to apply Rule 24(a)(2) rather than Rule 24(a)(1) to applications to intervene in bankruptcy adversary proceedings under § 1109(b)." Id.
73 Id.
71 See id. The court concurred with recent decisions which held that under § 1109(b), a
creditors' committee could initiate adversary proceedings "only if the bankruptcy trustee
or debtor-in-possession has failed to act to protect the creditors' interests." Id. (citations
omitted).
"' Id. "Our conclusion with respect to this legislative intent in no way restricts the broad,
legitimate right to appear and be heard that § 1109(b) grants to parties in interest." Id.
7' Allegheny, 107 Bankr. at 519.
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banks. 7 Since the debtor chose not to commence legal proceedings to recoup these assets, the creditors' committee, with the
court's permission, brought an adversary proceeding against the
banks on the bankrupt estate's behalf."8 The equity committee objected to the creditors' committee's choice of counsel to litigate
the adversary proceeding and sought to intervene. 9 The equity
committee's motion for intervention was granted in part by the
bankruptcy court. 80 On appeal, the district court affirmed that
portion of the bankruptcy court's decision allowing the equity
committee to intervene and reversed the bankruptcy court as to
its denial of the equity committee's motion.8 1
After initially addressing jurisdictional issues, 2 the court examined whether an equity committee possessed an unqualified
right to intervene in an adversary proceeding. 88 The district court
criticized the bankruptcy court for deciding that Marin was "no
longer good law," attacking the lower court's reasoning that
Bankruptcy Rules 2018 and 7024, enacted after Marin, rendered
84
§ 1109(b) inapplicable to adversary proceedings.
The Allegheny court then criticized Fuel Oil for not considering
Marin's discussion of the difference between commencing a bankruptcy petition and commencing an adversary proceeding.8 " Alie77 Id. at 520. The transfers in question involved over $440 million of Allegheny's assets
to various banks. Id.
78

Id.

Id. The equity committee claimed that the attorney had a conflict of interest since he
had represented some of the defendant banks in previous litigations. Id. The bankruptcy
court rejected the equity committee's claim and therefore, the equity committee, pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(1) and (a)(2), sought to intervene in the adversary
proceeding commenced by the creditors' committee. Id. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Rule 24).
" Allegheny, 107 Bankr. at 520-21. The bankruptcy court ruled that the equity committee could intervene as to the causes of action involving equitable subordination and breach
of the duties of good faith and fair dealing. Id. The court opined that since these claims
involved money owed only to equity holders and not to other creditors, the equity holders'
committee would not be adequately represented in the adversary proceeding by the creditors' committee. Id. The equity committee was not allowed to intervene as to the first nine
counts of the complaint which involved fraudulent transfers. Id. at 520. It was the opinion
of the bankruptcy court that any recovery as to these nine causes of action would increase
the recovery of all creditors. Id.
Id. at 525.
I8
82 Id. at 521-23.
8
Id. at 523-25.
" Id. at 523-24.
" Allegheny, 107 Bankr. at 524. The court stated that, under 11 U.S.C. §301, a volun79
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gheny applied this analysis to the advisory committee note for
Bankruptcy Rule 7024 and interpreted the committee note as requiring intervention in adversary proceedings to be sought separately. 8' Additionally, Allegheny interpreted Rule 2018 as applying
to parties not governed by § 1109(b).8 7 The court then compared
the substantive right to intervene, which Marin construed §
1109(b) as providing, with procedural rights under the bankruptcy rules. 8 In conclusion, Allegheny noted that although Fuel
Oil's arguments were persuasive, only the Third Circuit could decide to ignore Marin.8 9
III.

No

ABSOLUTE RIGHT OF INTERVENTION

IN ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS UNDER §

1109(b)

As previously noted, the only circuit courts of appeals which
have addressed the question of whether a creditors' committee
has an absolute statutory right of intervention in an adversary
proceeding are the Third and Fifth Circuits. 90 The discussion
which follows suggests that Marin incorrectly interpreted §
1109(b) as conferring an absolute right of intervention in an adversary proceeding and that Fuel Oil properly asserted that there
is no unconditional right of intervention in such a proceeding.
tary case was commenced by the filing of a petition, while, under Bankruptcy Rule 703, an
adversary proceeding was commenced by the filing of a complaint. Id. (citing Marin, 689
F.2d at 450). Allegheny reiterated Marin's position that this only proved that bankrutpcy
cases and adversary proceedings were commenced in different manners. Id.
Id. at 524.
'
Id. The court stated that since § 1109(b) involved intervention as of right while Rule
2018, which according to its advisory committee note implemented § 1109(b), involved
permissive intervention and a showing of cause in order to intervene, Rule 2018(a) appeared to apply to those parties not governed by § 1109(b). Id.
IId. at 524-25. The Allegheny court opined that since Marin interpreted § 1109(b) as
providing a substantive right of intervention, such a right could not be nullified by procedural bankruptcy rules. Id. at 524.
69 Id. at 525.
" Compare Marin, 689 F.2d at 446 (absolute statutory right of intervention) with Fuel Oil,
762 F.2d at 1287-88 (committee has no absolute right to intervene). See also Sarah R.
Neuman Found., Inc. v. Garrity (In re Neuman), 103 Bankr. 491, 495-96 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1989) (court noted split of authority between Third and Fifth Circuits); First Wisconsin
Nat'l Bank of Milwaukee v. Terex Corp. (In re Terex Corp.), 53 Bankr. 616, 622 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1985) (same).
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Distinctions Between "Case" and "Adversary Proceedings"

Marin interpreted the term "case" in § 1109(b) to encompass
adversary proceedings when it asserted that the statute conferred
an absolute right of intervention. 9 1 However, it is submitted that
"case" does not include "proceedings" based on distinctions made
between the two terms in Title 28 of the Code of Judiciary and
Judicial Procedure, Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and the
Bankruptcy Rules.
In Title 28 Section 157, Congress made separate reference to
"case" and "proceedings" when it granted district courts the
power to refer "cases under title 11 and . . . proceedings . . .related to a case under title 1 1.92 Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
addresses "case" and "proceedings" separately in Section 305
dealing with abstention.9" Under Title 11, "case" has been de" Marin, 689 F.2d at 446. See Longfellow Indus., Inc. v. Blumberg (In re Longfellow
Indus., Inc.), 76 Bankr. 338, 341 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same); Hanover Indus. Mach.
Co. v. American Can Co. (In re Hanover Indus. Mach. Co.), 61 Bankr. 551, 554 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1986) (following Marin court's assertion that § 1109(b) applied to adversary proceedings). But see Fuel Oil, 762 F.2d at 1286-87 (construed "case" narrowly as not including
adversary proceedings); CVC, Inc. v. Conway, Patton & Bouhall, HR10 Bank One, Akron,
N.A. (In re CVC, Inc.), 106 Bankr. 478, 479 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (same); Terex, 53
Bankr. at 623 (same); Kenan v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re George Rodman, Inc.), 33
Bankr. 348, 350 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983) (same); Segarra v. Banco Central y Economias
(In re Segarra), 14 Bankr. 870, 878 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1981) (same).
",See 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). The statute provides in pertinent part:
(a)Each district court may provide that any or all cases under title 11 and any or all
proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11
shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district.
(b)(1) Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all core
proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11 ....
Id.
Courts have distinguished between "case" and "proceedings" in the context of 28 U.S.C.
§ 157. See, e.g., In re Oceanquest Feeder Serv., Inc., 56 Bankr. 715, 719 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1986) ("Jurisdiction of the case and proceeding are vested solely in the District Court
..
omitted)); Cameron v. Anderson (In re American Energy), 50 Bankr. 175,
..
(citation
181 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) ("If a jury trial has been requested and the case is one sufficiently 'related' to the bankruptcy proceeding ....").
Recently, the Second Circuit decided that an adversary proceeding is a core proceeding
under § 157. Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of State of Pennsylvania (In re Ben Cooper), 896
F.2d 1394, 1399-1400 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 3269 (1990). The court's classification of adversary proceedings as core proceedings highlights the distinction made in Title
28 § 157 between "case" and "proceedings." See 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
" See 11 U.S.C. § 305 (1988). This section reads in pertinent part: "The court, after
notice and a hearing, may dismiss a case under this title, or may suspend all proceedings in a
case under this title .... Id. (emphasis added). See, e.g., In re Whitby, 51 Bankr. 184, 18687 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) (court suspended proceedings under § 305 pending resolution
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fined as "the original bankruptcy petition itself from which all
other proceedings spring."' ' In the bankruptcy context, "proceeding" is a broad and general term while "case" is more specific. 95 Therefore, it is submitted that "case" in § 1109(b) does
not include "adversary proceeding."
Although "adversary proceeding" is not defined anywhere in
the Code, it is classified by the Bankruptcy Rules.9 6 The present
Bankruptcy Rules draw many distinctions between "case" and
"proceedings." 9 Bankruptcy Rule 1001 differentiates between
the two terms and provides that the bankruptcy rules apply under
Title 11.98 Additionally, Part VII of the Bankruptcy Rules specifically addresses the procedure used in adversary proceedings.9 9
of state court action); In re G-N Partners, 48 Bankr. 459, 461-62 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985)
(creditors' motion for dismissal of bankruptcy case under § 305 denied; no showing that
dismissal was in debtor's or creditors' best interests). See also In re O'Neil Village Personal
Care Corp., 88 Bankr. 76, 79 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988) (key issue in determining § 305
dismissal is whether it will serve best interests of both debtor and creditor).
American Energy, 50 Bankr. at 178. See Hanover, 61 Bankr. at 553. "An adversary action is essentially a civil action nested within a bankruptcy case." Id.; WEINTRAUB & REsNicK, supra note 1,
6.05[2], at 6-22. "The typical bankruptcy case, although itself an
uncontested matter, may be characterized as an umbrella under which numerous related
lawsuits may be litigated." Id. "The Bankruptcy Rules require that any party who desires
to obtain any one of ten specific forms of relief in a bankruptcy case must proceed by
initiating an adversary proceeding." Id. (emphasis in original).
"6See In re S. E. Hornsby & Sons Sand & Gravel Co., Inc., 45 Bankr. 988, 994 (Bankr.
M.D. La. 1985). The Hornsby court, in referring to the jurisdictional scheme under 28
U.S.C. § 157, qualified a "case under Title 11" as "the bankruptcy case per se." Id.;
Segarra, 14 Bankr. at 878. The Segarra court described case as "the meat and potatoes of a
Chapter 11;" the time when plans are negotiated, a debtor's conduct investigated, and the
need for a trustee considered. Id.
"See Marin, 689 F.2d at 450 (finding "adversary proceeding" classified by Bankruptcy
Rule 701); D. H. Sharrer & Son, Inc. v. Sharrer Inv. Trust (In re D. H. Sharrer & Son,
Inc.), 44 Bankr. 976, 977 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1984) (quoting Marin holding). See also supra
note 9 (text of Bankruptcy Rule 7001 defining types of actions which qualify as adversary
proceedings).
" See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text (addressing distinctions between two
terms).
"SSee 11 U.S.C. BANKR. R. 1001 (1988). Bankruptcy Rule 1001 reads in pertinent part:
"The Bankruptcy Rules and Forms govern procedure in cases under Title 11 of the United
States Code .... These rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every case and proceeding." Id. (emphasis added).
The Bankruptcy Rules define the process by which Bankruptcy Code privileges are effected. Hanover, 61 Bankr. at 552.
" See 11 U.S.C. BAN R. R. 7001 (1988). "An adversary proceeding is governed by the
rules of this Part VII." Id.; 11 U.S.C. BANKR. R. 7001 advisory committee's note (1988).
Part VII rules "govern the procedural aspects of litigation" in adversary proceedings. Id.
Part VII rules were established so that practice before bankruptcy and district courts would
be uniform. Id. See generally 11 U.S.C. BANKR. R. 7001-7087 (1988) (bankruptcy rules appli-
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Rule 7001 describes an adversary proceeding as a proceeding in a
bankruptcy court and classifies various actions as adversary proceedings."' 0 A distinction is also made between "case" and "adversary proceedings" in Bankruptcy Rules 2018 and 7024.101
Based on the distinctions made between "case" and "proceedings" throughout the relevant statutes, 0 2 it is submitted that
"case" as used in § 1109(b) does not include "adversary
proceedings."
B.

§ 1109(b) - Substantive Right v. Procedural Rule

The Fifth Circuit in Fuel Oil determined that, because of the
distinctions made between "case" and "proceedings," particularly
the differences drawn by the advisory committee note to Bankruptcy Rule 7024 regarding intervention, § 1109(b) did not confer an absolute right of intervention in adversary proceedings. 0 3
However, if Marin is correct that § 1109(b) grants an absolute
statutory right of intervention in adversary proceedings, "it would
cable in adversary proceedings).
100See 11 U.S.C. BANKR. R. 7001 (1988); supra note 9 (text of Bankruptcy Rule 7001);
see, e.g., Horton v. Beaumont Place Homeowners Assoc., Inc. (In re Horton), 87 Bankr.
650, 651 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987) (debtor's motion for certificate of contempt against homeowners association was proper subject of adversary proceeding); Hallet v. Commerce Bank
of Barry County (In re Bilick), 67 Bankr. 670, 671 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) (petitioner's
request that court compel respondent bank to sell certain real property to her qualified as
adversary action under Rule 7001(1)); In re Ace Indus., Inc., 65 Bankr. 199, 200 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1986) (debtor's motion to get back equipment and tools should have been
brought as adversary proceeding).
101See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text (discussing Bankruptcy Rules 2018 and
7024 and their advisory committees' notes). See also Fuel Oil, 762 F.2d at 1286-87 (discussing distinctions made by bankruptcy rules 2018 and 7024 concerning intervention in cases
and proceedings); Allegheny, 107 Bankr. at 523-24 (same); First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank of
Milwaukee v. Terex Corp. (In re Terex Corp.), 53 Bankr. 616, 623 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1985) (same).
101See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text (discussion of distinctions between
"case" and "proceedings" in Titles 28 and 11 of United States Code and Title 11 Bankruptcy Rules).
10 Fuel Oil, 762 F.2d at 1286-87. Accord Kenan v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re
George Rodman, Inc.), 33 Bankr. 348, 348-50 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983). See also Sarah R.
Neuman Found. v. Garrity (In re Neuman), 103 Bankr. 491, 497 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(court rejected Marin's interpretation of § 1109(b) based on Fuel Oil's analysis). But see
Allegheny, 107 Bankr. at 524. The court in Allegheny was not persuaded that Bankruptcy
Rules 2018 and 7024 overruled Marin's holding that § 1109(b) conferred an absolute right
to intervene. Id.; Hanover Indus. Mach. Co. v. American Can Co. (In re Hanover Indus.
Mach. Co.), 61 Bankr. 551, 554 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986). The court in Hanover held that
they were bound by the Matin decision to grant an unconditional right of intervention. Id.
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be a substantive right that could not be nullified by procedural
rules."104 Bankruptcy rules, which are promulgated by the Supreme Court, are inherently procedural. 0 5 Congress restricted
the reach of the rules when it provided that they could not
"abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right." 10 6

It is submitted, however, that § 1109(b) does not confer a substantive right of intervention in adversary proceedings because it
is suggested that § 1109(b) does not apply to adversary proceedings.1 07 It is further proposed that Matin improperly expanded
the substantive right to be heard "in any issue in a case" to include the right to intervene in "adversary proceedings." While a
substantive, absolute right is granted in § 1109(b), it is suggested
that this right applies only to the main bankruptcy case and not to
adversary proceedings.108
'" Allegheny, 107 Bankr. at 524, See Gross & DeNatale, The Right of the Creditors' Committee to be Heard Under § 1109(b): An Update, Norton Bankr. L. Adviser 1985-11, at 6 (absolute right of intervention granted under § 1109(b) is substantive). But see Neuman, 103
Bankr. at 497. The Neuman court rejected Marin's position that § 1109(b) conferred an
unconditional right to intervene and concluded that no substantive right was affected. Id.
'0' Neuman, 103 Bankr. at 496. See Hanover, 61 Bankr. at 553. Section 2075 of Title 28
is "[t]he enabling statute authorizing the creation of Bankruptcy Rules .... Id.; 28 U.S.C.
§ 2075 (1988). The rule provides in pertinent part: "The Supreme Court shall have the
power to prescribe by general rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions,
and the practice and procedure in cases under Title 11." Id.; see also United New Mexico
Bank v. Wilferth (In re Wilferth), 57 Bankr. 693, 695 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1986) (inconsistent
procedural rule controlled by bankruptcy statute).
'" See 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1988).
The opponent of a bankruptcy rule has a "'heavy burden' of showing that [the rule]
deals with matters of substance rather than procedure." Wolff v. Wells Fargo Bank (In re
Moralez), 618 F.2d 76, 78 (9th Cir. 1980). Congress deferred to the Supreme Court's expertise in formulating rules of practice and procedure and a thorough process of review
was undertaken before the rules became effective. Id. See also Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Wall (In re Wall), 403 F. Supp. 357, 360 (E.D. Ark. 1975). "There is a strong presumption
that the Supreme Court did not abridge or modify any substantive right" when it adopted
the bankruptcy rules. Id. If the Supreme Court had overstepped its authority in promulgating rules pursuant to § 2075, "such transgression would have been noted and the offending
rule modified or deleted upon review." Id. See, e.g., In re National Store Fixture Co., 37
Bankr. 481, 489 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984) (denial of right of association and right to engage
in particular profession frustrated by extension of Rule 5002 to bar appointment as trustee
of person who associated with relative of judge making appointment). Cf. HFG Co. v. Pioneer Pub. Co., 162 F.2d 536, 539 (7th Cir. 1947) (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure enjoy
strong presumption of procedural character due to process accompanying enactment).
"~ See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text (discussing distinctions between "case"
and "proceedings").
'" See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (defining "case" and "adversary
proceedings").
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The proposed interpretation of § 1109(b) still comports with
the statute's legislative history of expanding creditors' rights.10 9
While Section 77B, the predecessor statute to § 1109(b), merely
permitted creditors an absolute right to be heard on two occasions,110 a creditors' committee today is given additional powers
under the Bankruptcy Code."'
C.

Creditors' Committee's Right to Initiate Adversary Proceedings

The court in Fuel Oil found further support for its interpretation of § 1109(b) in bankruptcy cases which addressed a creditors'
committee's right to initiate adversary proceedings.'
The authority for a creditors' committee to initiate adversary
proceedings, although not expressly stated in the Bankruptcy
Code, 1 8 has been found under § 1109(b) ' and under Section
1103(c)(5) of Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code." 5 Under both
See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text (legislative history of § 1109(b)).
Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911, 917 (1934). In reorganizations,
creditors could only be heard on the permanent appointment of a trustee and on the approval of any reorganization plan. Id. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (discussion of § 77B, predecessor to § 1109(b) and Chapter X Section 206).
...See 11 U.S.C. § 1103 (1988) (powers and duties of committees); supra note 8 (text of
§ 1103).
n' See Fuel Oil, 762 F.2d at 1287.
"' Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Monsour Medical Center (In re Monsour Medical'
Center), 5 Bankr. 715, 717 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1980). See Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors of Joyanna Holitogs, Inc. v. I. Hyman Corp. (In re Joyanna Holitogs), 21 Bankr.
323, 325 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (court assumed Congress did not intend to deny creditors
opportunity to vindicate their rights, notwithstanding absence in Code of express grant).
See also Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Farmers Savings Bank (In re Toledo Equip. Co.,
Inc.), 35 Bankr. 315, 318 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983) (recovery of preferential transfers by
creditors' committee not expressly authorized in Code).
114 See Fuel Oil, 762 F.2d at 1287 (court agreed that § 1109(b) permitted creditors' committee to initiate adversary proceeding but only if trustee did not adequately represent
committee); Creditors' Comm. for Jermoo's Inc. v. Jermoo's, Inc., (In re Jermoo's, Inc.), 38
Bankr. 197, 199-200 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984) (creditors' committee may intiate proceeding under § 1109(b) when trustee or debtor-in-possession breaches statutory duties); Chemical Separations Corp. v. Foster Wheeler Corp. (In re Chemical Separations Corp.), 32
Bankr. 816, 819 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983) (§ 1109(b) permitted creditors' committee to
commence adversary proceeding against insider of bankrupt estate when debtor-in-possession unjustifiably declined bringing claim it might have against insider); Joyanna Holitogs, 21
Bankr. at 326 (creditors' committee had right to sue where trustee or debtor-in-possession
unjustifiably would not). But see Segarra v. Banco Central y Economias (In re Segarra), 14
Bankr. 870, 878 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1981) (creditors' committee cannot initiate adversary proceedings pursuant to § 1109(b)).
'" See In re Evergreen Valley Resort, Inc., 27 Bankr. 75, 75-76 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983).
The court stated that under § 1103(c)(5), a creditors' committee was authorized to initiate
IM
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provisions, standing for a creditors' committee to commence such
proceedings has been found where the court determined that the
trustee or debtor-in-possession of the bankrupt estate did not adequately protect the interests of the creditors' committee."'
This analysis of initiating adversary proceedings is similar to the
analysis used in implementing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
24(a)(2), which deals with intervention as of right when the inter-

venor's interests are not sufficiently represented."1 ' Consequently,
it is submitted that a creditors' committee should only be allowed
to intervene as of right if its interests are not being protected. 1 8

D. Policy Reasons for Not Allowing Absolute Right of Intervention
Under § 1109(b)
It is submitted that § 1109(b) should not confer an absolute
right of intervention in adversary proceedings for various policy
an adversary proceeding against the sole stockholder of a debtor where the debtor failed to
act upon a claim which would benefit the bankrupt estate. Id.; Official Creditors' Comm. of
Wesco Prods. Co. v. Alloy Automotive Co. (In re Wesco Prods. Co.), 22 Bankr. 107, 109
(Bankr. N.D. Ill., 1982). Section 1103(c)(5) grants implied authority for a creditors' committee to initiate adversary proceedings when the trustee acts improperly. Id. While the
court in Wesco recognized Section 1103(c)(5)'s implied right for a creditors' committee to
initiate adversary proceedings, it did not permit the creditors' committee to do so since the
debtor-in-possession acted in good faith and initiated an adversary proceeding itself. Id. See
also Monsour Medical Center, 5 Bankr. at 718-19 (§ 1103(c)(5) restricted creditors' right to
initiate suit on behalf of bankrupt estate).
1'
See supra notes 114-15 (citing cases where creditors' committees were not allowed to
initiate proceedings unless their interests were unprotected). See generally Blain & Erne,
Creditors' Committees Under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code: Creation, Composition, Powers and Duties, 67 MARq. L. REv. 491, 505-09 (1984) (discussing creditors' committee standing to initiate adversary proceedings).
Some courts have allowed a creditors' committee to initiate proceedings only on behalf
of the bankrupt estate, while other courts have allowed the committee to maintain an action in its own name. Compare Hansen v. Finn (In re Curry and Sorenson, Inc.), 57 Bankr.
824, 828-29 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986) ("action to set aside a fraudulent transfer must be
brought in the name of the bankruptcy estate as the real party in interest") with In re
Nicolet, Inc., 80 Bankr. 733, 739 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (committee can bring suit in its
own name).
...See Fuel Oil, 762 F.2d at 1287. The court in Fuel Oil stated that the bankruptcy courts
which gave a creditors' committee a qualified and non-absolute right to initiate adversary
proceedings used the same analysis for intervention in adversary proceedings under Rule
24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Accord CVC, Inc. v. Conway, Patton &
Bowhall, HR 10 Bank One, Akron, N.A. (In re CVC, Inc.), 106 Bankr. 478, 479 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1989) (finding Fuel Oil's reasoning "limiting intervention of right to the standards in R.24(a)(2) to be more persuasive" than Matin's). See also supra note 23 (text and
discussion of Federal Rule 24(a)(2)).
18 See Fuel Oil, 762 F.2d at 1287.
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reasons. While both the Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession and the
trustee are fiduciaries responsible for protecting the bankrupt estate's assets,1 19 the creditors' committee is entitled to review and
participate in a bankruptcy case in limited situations.'" It is submitted that an interpretation of § 1109(b) which allows a creditors' committee the absolute right to intervene in adversary proceedings would hinder the debtor-in-possession and the trustee in
the performance of their obligations. The courts should reinforce
the powers and fiduciary responsibilities of the debtor-in-possession and the trustee rather than undermine them by granting an
absolute statutory right of intervention. 1 It is suggested that in
order to foster the delicate balance of designated duties of the
debtor-in-possession and the trustee with those of the creditors'
committee, Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is the proper conduit for intervention in adversary proceedings.
Intervention by creditors' committees interferes with expediency and simplicity which are crucial in bankruptcy cases in order
to keep administrative expenses at a minimum and to strive for
prompt distribution of creditors' claims.12 The authors believe
1" See Northwestern Nat'l Bank of St. Paul v. Halux, Inc. (In re Halux, Inc.), 665 F.2d
213, 216 (8th Cir. 1981). "A debtor-in-possession or a trustee, not the creditor, has the
duty to protect and conserve the property in his possession for the benefit of creditors." Id.
(citations omitted); Sarah R. Neuman Found., Inc. v. Garrity (In re Neuman), 103 Bankr.
491, 500 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989). The court in Neuman asserted that a Chapter 11 debtorin-possession or trustee is a designated fiduciary per the Bankruptcy Code. Id.; First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank of Milwaukee v. Terex Corp. (In re Terex Corp.), 53 Bankr. 616, 620
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). To fulfill fiduciary obligations, the debtor-in-possession and the
trustee "must conduct its affairs in the best interests of the estate which includes the collection of assets for the estate." Id.; 11 U.S.C. §§ 1106, 1107 (1988) (duties of trustee and
debtor-in-possession). See also Sowerwine v. Air Canada (In re REA Holding Corp.), 8
Bankr. 75, 81 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980). "There is a broad sense of equity and fiduciary duty
pervading the entire bankruptcy administration." Id.
110 See Neuman, 103 Bankr. at 500. "[T]he creditors' committee .. .ha[s] rights of participation and oversight in a bankruptcy case which are spelled out in the Bankruptcy Code
and Rules." Id.; Terex, 53 Bankr. at 621. A creditors' committee's role in an adversary
proceeding is to monitor and to keep informed of all major developments in the proceeding. Id.; REA Holding, 8 Bankr. at 81. A creditors' committee advises creditors of their
rights and of the proper course of action to be taken. Id.
Section 1103 of Title 11 of the United States Code lists the powers and duties of creditors' committees. See 11 U.S.C. § 1103 (1988); supra note 8 (text of § 1103).
,19
See Neuman, 103 Bankr. at 501. "It should be the court's role to reinforce the trustee's Bankruptcy Code-granted authority and fiduciary responsibility for the management
of the estate and not to weaken it through multiple interventions." Id.
...See Terex, 53 Bankr. at 621. Intervention by creditors' committees "would necessitate
renewed discovery demands and result in duplicitous effort, larger attorney fees, and
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that these policy considerations are better achieved by not allowing creditors' committees an absolute right of intervention
pursuant to § 1109(b).
CONCLUSION

A creditors' committee does not have an absolute right of intervention in adversary proceedings pursuant to § 1109(b) of Title
11 to the United States Code. Rather, § 1109(b) grants an absolute right to be heard in the main bankruptcy case.
The entire Bankruptcy Code is silent with respect to adversary
proceedings whereas the Bankruptcy Rules do address intervention in adversary proceedings. The Bankruptcy Rules specifically
implement Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to afford a creditors' committee with an opportunity to intervene if
the circumstances require. Thus, the creditors' committees' interests are protected while interference in the bankruptcy case and
any adversary proceeding is minimized.
Stacey A. Fabrizio & Maria T. Rivero

higher consequent cost to the estate, thereby depleting the reserve for the unsecured creditors." Id.; H.R. RE.P. No.595, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5975. "Speed and efficiency in bankruptcy is . . . essential, because
delay only operates to devalue assets, hinder financial rehabilitation, and prevent exercise
of right." Id. See also Neuman, 103 Bankr. at 500 (intervention in adversary proceeding by
creditors' committee imposes added expense on bankrupt estate and interferes with compromise and settlement of litigation); Official Creditors' Comm. of Wesco Prods. Co. v.
1982)
Alloy Automotive Co. (In re Wesco Prods. Co.), 22 Bankr. 107, 110 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
("unnecessary duplication in litigation must and will be avoided . . .").
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